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ABSTRACT 
Stochastic Analysis of Selected Hedging Strategies 
for Cotton in the Texas Southern High Plains. (April 2002) 
Willis A. Richardson 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Joe L. Outlaw 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
The most significant problem facing agriculture is price volatility. Farm prices 
are very unstable as evidenced by the wide swings in Texas cotton prices and by 
Congress approving ad hoc disaster payments in each of the past four years to help 
farmers. 
Farmers have risk management tools in the futures and options markets that 
could help them with the problems they face regarding price volatility. Questions 
remain about how they should hedge their crops, when they should hedge, and in which 
market they should hedge their commodity. The purpose of this thesis was to analyze 
alternative marketing strategies in both the futures and options markets. 
A simulation model was developed to simulate weekly cash and future prices and 
option premiums for cotton in West Texas. The model was simulated to analyze the 
economic consequences of alternative hedging strategies. 
For the analysis, the hedging strategies were tested for both long and short crop 
years. In a long crop year all eight hedging strategies resulted in lower relative risk 
(coefficient variation) then the cash sales strategy. In a short crop year the relative risk 
on receipts was reduced slightly for only three of the eight hedging strategies. 
In conclusion, this study reveals that West Texas cotton farmers could better 
manage price risk by using a marketing strategy that involves the uses of the futures 
market for cotton. In short crop years risk averse decision makers would prefer to hedge 
their crop. In long crop years producers who are risk averse and moderately risk loving 
would prefer to use a marketing strategy that calls for purchasing puts on the options 
market. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Texas cotton farmers marketed about five million bales of cotton in the year 2000 
at an average price of 54 cents per pound for a value of $1. 3 billion. Cotton is the 
number one crop in Texas in terms of acres and gross receipts. Increasing the price per 
pound by just 3 cents would have increased returns to cotton farmers by $72 million. 
Over the past year monthly cotton prices in Texas have ranged from 56. 75 cents per 
pound to 26 cents per pound. 
The most significant problem facing agriculture is price volatility. Farm prices 
are very unstable as evidenced by the wide swings in Texas cotton prices and by 
Congress approving ad hoc disaster payments in each of the past four years to help 
farmers. Instability in price has increased since the 1996 Farm Bill was passed. The 
1996 Farm Bill contributed to increased price instability by eliminating the target price 
program and CCC support prices. Ray, et al. (1998) and Adams (2000) have shown that 
the change in farm programs in 1996 increased the price risk to farmers by as much as 
50 percent. 
Another source of price instability is due to unstable exports, as evidenced by 
recent decreases in the amount of agricultural products being exported. The United 
States Department of Agriculture reports that U. S. cotton exports have fallen 20 percent 
since 1995 (USDA 2001). Export decline can be partly attributed to the slow recovery 
process in Russia's economy after the fall of the Soviet Union and economic problems in 
This thesis follows the style and format of the American Journal of A ricultural 
Economics. 
Southeast Asia and Japan. A strong U. S. dollar also contributes to weaker export sales 
by making our products relatively more expensive. Farmers and agribusinesses in the 
U. S. do not control these factors, yet their incomes are directly tied to international trade 
and economies in the rest of the world. 
The foreseeable future indicates that Texas cotton producers face decreased 
demand and more volatile prices. The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) January 2001 Baseline projects continued weak demand for U. S. cotton exports 
and low prices through 2009. Increased price risk in an era of low prices has put even 
greater pressure on Texas cotton farmers to find better ways to manage price risk while 
marketing their produce. 
Winston (1996) said, "That by selling (or shorting) futures we can reduce the risk 
involved in holding a commodity" (p. 176). Farmers have risk management tools in the 
futures and options markets that could help them with the problems they face regarding 
price volatility. Questions remain about how they should hedge their crops, when they 
should hedge, and in which market they should hedge their commodity (Chicago Board 
of Trade, 1998). 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze alternative marketing strategies in both 
the futures and options markets. Reduced price risk through better marketing would 
allow farmers to fix their price before harvest and thus reduce their overall risk, which 
allows them to produce more of their commodity in a more efficient manner. 
Additionally, improved marketing strategies that manage price risk will make Texas 
farmers more competitive in the global market for cotton. 
CHAPTER II 
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND & LITURATURE REVIEW 
Technical Background 
An understanding of some basic terms and concepts is needed to understand the 
use of the futures markets and the hedging strategies found in this Thesis. A futures 
contract is defined as an agreement between the seller and the buyer of the contract. On 
the day a contract is opened the seller agrees to deliver a commodity (in this case cotton) 
to some predetermined destination at a specified date in the future, for a certain price. 
One futures contract for cotton consists of 50, 000 pounds of cotton lint or roughly l 00 
bales of cotton. To accomplish the buying and selling of futures contracts, organizations 
such as the New York Commodities Exchange exist to facilitate transactions. Cotton 
futures contracts are traded for eighteen months, for each of several specified delivery 
months. There are five different delivery months for cotton currently being traded on the 
New York Commodities Exchange: March, May, July, October, and December. The 
December cotton futures contract is used here because this contract month most closely 
corresponds to cotton harvest in Texas. 
There are two basic types of buyers and sellers in the futures market, hedgers and 
speculators. A hedger is someone who takes offsetting positions in the cash and futures 
market to protect his profit from adverse price movements. Cotton farmers who want to 
protect against decreases in cash prices during the growing and/or harvesting seasons 
would establish a short hedge (sell futures contracts to cover part of their expected 
production costs). Hedging assumes that cash and futures prices move closely together 
and in the same direction. Speculators buy and sell futures contracts without taking an 
offsetting position in the cash market. This system works because the speculator 
assumes the price risk in hopes of gaining a profit by correctly predicting price 
movements in the futures market while never expecting to actually handle the 
commodity. 
A short hedge is defined as a hedge placed (a futures contract sold) to protect 
against downward price movements in the cash market (Catlett and Libbin 1999, p. 65). 
By selling a futures contract hedgers hope to offset losses from a falling cash market 
with gains in the futures market. 
Basis is defined as the difference between cash and futures price on any given 
day. The basis is important in hedging because the hedger is not subject to price risk but 
is affected by basis risk. If the closing basis could be predicted accurately, the hedger 
would know the pro-off price' for his commodity before the hedge was placed, and all 
price risk would be removed. The basis is important in making a decision on whether to 
deliver or close the hedge. If the closing basis is greater than the delivery cost, it would 
be profitable for a short hedger to deliver the cash commodity rather than buying back 
the futures contract to cancel the short hedge. Delivery does not take place the majority 
of the time. 
Generally Texas cotton farmers in the Southern High Plans close out their 
position by offsetting (buying "back") the number of contracts sold earlier, before the 
' Pro-off price is calculated by adding the current futures price to the average or expected closing basta 
price. 
contract month matures. The futures contract sold on the New York Commodity 
Exchange is grade 41 with a staple length of I & I/16 inch strict low middling (SLM). 
Very little of the cotton grown in Texas will be of this grade or staple length. The 
farmer, therefore, places an imperfect hedge, for example, he does not plan to deliver his 
cotton but only assumes the price for his cotton will closely follow that of the futures 
market. The farmer may deliver his cotton but would be required to take a discount for 
the particular grade and staple of his product. 
Another way to achieve protection from falling prices is to buy a put option 
(Catlett and Libbin 1999, p. 182). A put option provides a predetermined strike price 
that gives a sturdy price floor, but also allows the producer to take advantage of rising 
prices. The strike price can be above (in the money) or below (out of the money) the 
current future's price. The price paid for this market flexibility is the option premium, 
which is paid in full when the option premium is bought. In a falling market a farmer 
can offset (taking a second marketing position opposite the initial one) or exercise (both 
the buyer and seller are assigned a futures position) the option creating a short futures 
position. On the other hand, in a rising futures market, the farmer does not need 
protection, so he lets the option contract expire or offsets it to capture any remaining 
time value in the premium. 
Literature Review 
All decisions in today's world deal with uncertainty. One way people deal with 
the problem of uncertainty is to generate and analyze many alternative scenarios (Weida, 
Richardson, and Vazsonyi 2001, p. 247). The problem with this type of approach is that 
some scenarios have a greater probability of occurring than others and this makes it 
difficult for people to see the entire range of consequences that might occur from 
decisions they make or actions they take. Thus simulation is an important tool because it 
helps to quantify the uncertainty inherently found in the decision making process. 
"Today we rely less on superstition and tradition than people did in the past, not 
because we are more rational, but because our understanding of risk enables us to make 
decisions in a rational mode" (Bernstein 1996, p. 4). Simulation is a tool that allows us 
to manage risk in our day-to-day activities. It is suggested that when probabilities are 
too complex to be considered manually, simulation is a useful way of analyzing 
situations (Weida, Richardson, and Vazsonyi 2001, p. 247). 
Reutlinger analyzed different methods for evaluating the riskiness of investment 
projects. He used an approximation of probability distributions from actual projects to 
simulate an estimated sample. Jones (1972) demonstrated the applicability of simulation 
for analyzing alternative risk management strategies for business decisions. Hardaker, 
Dillon, and Anderson (1977) indicated that simulation is the preferred methodology for 
analyzing risky decisions in agriculture, 
Simulation has been used to analyze alternative hedging strategies designed to 
manage the volatility of prices in the futures and options markets. For example Bailey 
and Richardson (1985) simulated alternative marketing strategies for Texas cotton 
farmers to determine the economic payoffs from using future prices to hedge price risk. 
Their analysis is dated as they considered only futures contracts where as this project 
uses options contracts and futures as the risk management tools. 
Simulation analysis of risky marketing strategies is a way of estimating the 
probability distribution of returns for alternative hedging and cash strategies. Several 
methods have been suggested and used to rank alternative probability distribution for 
risky investments. Bailey (1985) used stochastic dominance with respect to a function to 
rank alternative hedging strategies. Hardaker, Dillon, and Anderson (1977) suggest the 
use of mean variance and stochastic dominance with respect to a function for ranking 
risky strategies. Richardson (2002) describes ten different methods for ranking risky 
strategies. His dynamic certainty equivalents method extends the ranking of risky 
alternatives beyond stochastic dominance by showing the risk aversion level where 
decision makers switch preferences, much like McCarps (1988) risk root calculator. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Marketing Strategies 
For a point of comparison, this study used a base marketing strategy that sold the 
whole crop on the cash market the last week in November. Alternative hedging 
strategies were then compared to these results. Cash prices were obtained from 
Wednesday's closing prices for cotton 1 and I/16 inch SLM in Lubbock Texas (NYCEh 
Six alternative marketing strategies were analyzed. The final net price for all 
strategies was calculated by taking the difference between the sold futures contract price 
and the ending futures contract price in the fourth week of November and then adding 
the final cash price at the end of November. 
Two different types of hedging strategies were tested. The first hedging strategy 
was to sell at the beginning of the contract in December, and the second type of hedge 
was to sell after planting in May. Within these two types of hedging strategies, three 
different rules for starting the hedge were analyzed. The first two strategies hedged the 
entire amount of the crop when the futures price was greater then the cost of production 
per pound. These two strategies are referred to as "Dec All" and "May All. " The next 
two strategies hedged one third of the crop when the futures price exceeded the cost of 
production; it then hedged another third of the crop when the price went above the cost 
of production again; and hedged the final third of the crop when the futures price went 
above the cost of production for the third time. These two strategies are referred to as 
"Dec I/3" and "May 1/3. " In much the same way the fifth and sixth strategies hedged a 
quarter of the crop the first four times that the futures price rose above the cost of 
production. These two strategies are referred to as "Decl/4" and "May 1/4. " 
Two hedging strategies that utilized options were analyzed. The final net price 
for the options strategies was calculated by adding the profit or loss from the option 
premium between purchase of the put and sale of the put in November to the final cash 
price received for cotton in November. The first option based hedge (November) was 
initiated when the in the money strike price was greater then the cost of production. The 
second option based hedge (November) was sold when the out of the money hedge was 
greater then the cost of production. 
Data Analysis 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to analyze the economic consequences of the 
nine alternative marketing strategies. Simulation was used because it is a methodology 
that has been used to analyze marketing strategies and it is a tool for analyzing strategies 
for risk management. To simulate alternative cotton marketing strategies, forecasts of 
the cash and futures prices were needed. 
The first step in simulating alternative marketing strategies is to forecast cash and 
future prices. A time series technique — vector autoregression (VAR) was used to 
forecast the cash and future prices. Time series models forecast future values through 
past observations. Ford (1986) describes vector autoregression as "a system of equations 
whose dependent variables are regressed on lagged observations of all the variables in 
the system" (p. 4). Weekly cash and futures prices from December 1990 to November 
2001 were analyzed with the VAR model. The number of lags used in estimating the 
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VAR model was seven, which was based on analyzing the sample autocorrelation 
coefficients for cash and futures price series. Based on the Dickey-Fuller test, the first 
difference of cash and futures prices was deemed to be sufficient to make the data 
stationary. 
The time series model's forecasts for the 2002 cotton crop were considered to be 
unrealistic. The model forecasted prices declining to 19 cents per pound while FAPRI, 
forecasted that cotton prices would be about 40 cents per pound in 2002. The VAR 
model generated such low prices because the forecast weighted recent developments in 
the market too heavily. In June of 2001, China released 2 million bales of excess cotton 
onto the world market and thus caused cotton prices to drop in the short run. The VAR 
model was unable to turn around the resulting down turn in prices. 
To analyze marketing strategies with such a strong downward trend in prices is 
unrealistic, so an alternative method was implemented. A decomposition forecasting 
method was used to forecast and simulate cash and futures prices (Diabold 2000, p. 207- 
240). The procedure called for segregating the historical data into different types of 
marketing years, developing indices for each year, and applying the indices to FAPRI's 
forecast for cotton prices in 2002. The first step in the process was to separate the 
weekly historical prices for 1990 to 2001 into two different types of years, namely years 
where prices trended. Diabold (2000) calls this a regime switching technique (p. 75). 
The stock to use ratio, announced at the beginning of the year, was used to predict 
whether prices would trend up or down. This is referred to as separating the data into 
short and long crop years'. This resulted in six years being classified as short crop years 
(1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998) and six being classified as long crop years (1992, 
1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001). Residuals from mean annual prices were calculated 
each year for each of the twelve years (j) and each of the 52 (i) weeks, resulting in series 
of e; = 0, „— On where 0„ is the mean of observed prices in year j and O„are observed 
prices in year j for week i. These twelve sets of residuals constitute relative price risk 
for a marketing year and incorporate the historical inter-temporal correlation within 
actual years. 
A bootstrap simulation technique was used to simulate (select) a set of annual 
cotton price residuals from either the short or long crop year residuals database. Care 
was taken to insure the stochastically drawn fractional residuals maintained their week- 
to-week relationship observed in history. Bootstrapping is a procedure for simulating 
Monte Carlo outcomes and is most often used to estimate variances for distribution 
parameters (Richardson 2002). It is used with small sample sizes when the cost of 
increasing the sample size is too high. The bootstrap method is able to increase the 
sample size by re-sampling the original data set with replacement, many times. This 
method thus offers an inexpensive way to expand sample size and reduce the variance on 
the population parameters. 
' Short crop years have a stock to use ratio & 1. 22 and long crop years have a stock to use ratro & 1. 22, 
based on the past 12 years of cotton prices. 
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Simulation Model 
The simulation model consisted of a six-step process. In the first step, bootstrap 
techniques were used to randomly select a sequence of random deviates from the 
historical database of deviations of cash price from the annual means. This yielded a 52- 
week forecast of random deviations from the mean price. In step two, the model 
multiplied the stochastically selected weekly random deviates by the average forecasted 
annual price from FAPRI, which resulted in random weekly cash prices for twelve 
months. The bootstrap technique allowed the inter-temporal correlation of pnces to be 
maintained as they had been observed in the past. The resulting random weekly cash 
prices were used as the "realized" cash prices, and to analyze the different hedging 
strategies. 
Step three of the model used a regression equation to calculate the stochastic 
futures price as a function of cash price thus yielding stochastic weekly future prices. 
The results of an ordinary least squares regression equation relating weekly futures 
prices to cash prices was: 
Intercept Slope 
Beta 6. 842 0. 986 
t-statistic 8. 535 67. 383 
R-Square= 0. 936 F-test=4540. 533 
Standard Deviation Residuals= 2. 470 
The simulated random weekly future prices for each of the 52 weeks was FP = (bo) + 
(bi) (cash price) + (standard deviation residuals * SND) where SND is a random 
independent standard normal deviate. In step four, the weekly stochastic future prices 
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were used in the Black-Scholes model to calculate implied volatility and option 
premiums for each week. The option premiums were calculated using stochastic future 
prices thus yielding stochastic premiums. Next, step five calculated the pro-off price 
(futures price + average ending basis) for each week using the historical average basis 
for the fourth week of November and the stochastic weekly futures prices. The pro-off 
price was compared to triggers, in the different hedging strategies, which initiated short 
hedge contracts when the pro-off price was greater then the cost of production'. The 
final step calculated the net price by adding the gains or loses, from the marketing 
strategy, to the cash price for selling the crop in the fourth week in November. 
In summary, the model simulated stochastic weekly cash prices, future prices, 
option premiums, and pro-off prices. Alternative marketing strategies were then 
evaluated by using these stochastic values. The model was simulated for 100 iterations 
(replications) using the pseudo-random number procedure in Simetar . The stochastic 4 
prices generated by the model were tested to insure that they replicated the historical 
price risk for long and short year crops. 
The cash sales strategy used the stochastic cash price for the fourth week in 
November to calculate cash receipts. Cash receipts were used as a base for comparing 
the other strategies. The 100 percent hedge before planting strategy was evaluated by 
Cost of Production was estimated to be $. 55 per pound. 
' Simatar (Simulatton for Excel To Analyze Risk) is an Excel Add-In used to simulate risk models 
programmed in Excel It was developed at Texas A&M Untversity, for risk analysis, by Richardson, 
Schumann, and Feldman (2002). 
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short hedging in the first week when the pro-off price exceeded the cost of production. 
The receipts earned under this strategy were simulated by adding (or subtracting) profits 
(or losses) from the hedge to the receipts from cash sales in the fourth week of 
November. Gains from hedging were observed when the futures price decreased over 
the year. 
The option marketing strategies were simulated in a similar fashion. The returns 
to an option hedging strategy were calculated as the sum of cash receipts plus profits (or 
losses) gained from premiums. Because an option is the right to sell but not the 
obligation to sell: in years that prices increased above the option strike price, the original 
premium paid was lost because the hedger would let the contract expire to get a higher 
price for their cotton. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS FOR SELECTED MARKETING STRATEGIES 
Nine marketing strategies were simulated in a stochastic model using historical 
risk for the past twelve years. The strategies evaluated were: 
Cash — sell all cotton at the fourth week of November cash price. 
Dec All — short hedge all cotton the first week the pro-off price is greater then the 
cost of production. 
Dec 1/3 — short hedge 1/3 of the cotton the first three weeks the pro-off price is 
greater then the cost of production. 
Dec 1/4 — short hedge 1/4 of the cotton the first four weeks the pro-off price is 
greater then the cost of production. 
May All — short hedge all cotton the first week, after May 1, that the pro-off price 
is greater then the cost of production. 
May 1/3 — short hedge 1/3 of the cotton the first three weeks, after May 1, that 
the pro-off price is greater then the cost of production. 
May 1/4 — short hedge 1/4 of the cotton the first four weeks, after May 1, that the 
pro-off price is greater then the cost of production. 
In Money — sell a put option the first week that the in the money pro-off price is 
greater then the cost of production. 
Out Money — sell a put option the first week that the out of the money pro-off 
price is greater then the cost of production. 
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Results of the nine marketing strategies are summarized in Table 1. The results 
indicate that average returns for hedging cotton would exceed cash sales in five of the 
eight strategies, regardless of whether it is a short or long crop year. The average gains 
to hedging for these strategies are substantial (2 to 3 cents per pound). In a long crop 
year, all eight strategies resulted in lower relative risk or coefficient of variation (CV) 
then the cash sales strategy. Five of these strategies cut the relative risk associated with 
cash sales of 21 percent to about 11 percent. In a short crop year the relative risk on 
receipts was reduced slightly for three of the eight marketing strategies. 
The simulated returns for the nine marketing strategies were ranked using 
stochastic dominance with respect to a function (Table 2), Lower and upper risk 
aversion coefficients (RAC's) of — 0. 2 and 0. 2, respectively, were used for the analysis. 
The results are inconclusive because the order of preference differs from the lower RAC 
to the upper RAC. For example, in the long crop year results, the cash sales strategy is 
ranked first for the lower RAC (-0. 2) and cash sales is ranked last for the upper RAC 
(0. 2). These results indicate a switching of preferences between the — 0. 2 to 0. 2 RAC 
interval. In addition, the short crop years in the stochastic dominance rankings on Table 
2 also are not consistent within the — 0. 2 to 0. 2 RAC intervals. The risk averse decision 
(0. 2 RAC) maker would rank the Dec All hedging strategy first, followed by the Dec I/4 
and Dec I/3 strategies. Decision makers with this level of risk aversion would rank the 
two strategies that used options the lowest. The simulation results warranted further 
analysis because of the inconsistent rankings given the — 0. 2 to 0. 2 RAC intervals. 
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Table 1. Statistical Summary of Simulated Hedging Strategies for Cotton 
Long 
Cash Dec All Dec 1/3 Dec I/4 May All May I/3 May I/4 In Money Out Money 
Mean 59. 91 61. 64 61. 64 61. 58 58. 48 58. 49 58. 57 63. 01 63. 12 
StDev 12. 97 7. 23 6. 79 6 84 11. 75 11. 47 11. 36 6 99 7. 10 
CV 21. 65 11. 73 11. 02 11. 10 20. 09 19. 61 19. 39 11. 09 11. 24 
Min 37. 80 48. 14 49. 17 49. 02 37 80 37. 80 37. 80 52. 00 51. 81 
Max 77. 04 83. 28 79. 43 79. 68 82. 79 82. 08 81. 45 78. 92 78. 40 
Short 
Cash Dec All Dec 1/3 Dec I/4 May All May I/3 May I/4 In Money Out Money 
Mean 59. 93 59. 95 59. 93 59. 94 59. 94 59. 96 59. 98 59. 28 59. 25 
StDev 7. 93 7. 73 7. 60 7. 56 8. 48 
CV 13. 23 12. 89 12. 68 12. 61 14. 15 
8. 40 
14. 01 
8. 37 8. 23 8. 20 
13. 95 13. 89 13. 84 
Min 
Max 
48. 01 45. 95 44. 51 44. 13 41. 00 43 89 44 29 44. 97 45. 40 
72. 58 77. 84 76. 77 77. 37 78. 63 79. 31 78. 74 77. 69 77. 20 
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Table 2. Ranking of Marketing Strategies Based on Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function 
Long Crop Year 
Lower Risk Aversion Ranking 
Series Name Level of Preference 
Upper Risk Aversion Ranking 
Series Name Level of Preference 
Cash 
May All 
May I/3 
Dec All 
Out Money 
In Money 
May I/4 
Dec I/4 
Dec I/3 
Most Preferred 
2nd Most Preferred 
3rd Most Preferred 
4th Most Preferred 
5th Most Preferred 
6th Most Preferred 
7th Most Preferred 
8th Most Preferred 
Least Preferred 
In Money 
Out Money 
Dec I/3 
Dec '/ 
Dec All 
May '/~ 
May I/3 
May All 
Cash 
Most Preferred 
2nd Most Preferred 
3rd Most Preferred 
4th Most Preferred 
5th Most Preferred 
6th Most Preferred 
7th Most Preferred 
8th Most Preferred 
Least Preferred 
Series Name Level of Preference 
Short Crop Year 
Lower Risk Aversion Ranking Upper Risk Aversion Ranking 
Series Name Level of Preference 
May All 
May I/4 
May 1/3 
Dec All 
In Money 
Dec I/4 
Out Money 
Cash 
Dec I/3 
Most Preferred 
2nd Most Preferred 
3rd Most Preferred 
4th Most Preferred 
5th Most Preferred 
6th Most Preferred 
7th Most Preferred 
8th Most Preferred 
Least Preferred 
Dec All 
Dec '/4 
Dec 1/3 
May '/~ 
May I/3 
Cash 
May All 
In Money 
Out Mone 
Most Preferred 
2nd Most Preferred 
3rd Most Preferred 
4th Most Preferred 
5th Most Preferred 
6th Most Preferred 
7th Most Preferred 
8th Most Preferred 
Least Preferred 
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Dynamic certainty equivalents (DCE) analyses were performed on the simulated 
data. Results of the DCE analysis were summarized in Figure 1 and 2. For a long crop 
year the DCE results indicate that persons who have RAC's less then — 0. 06 would prefer 
cash sales, but persons who have RAC's greater then — 0. 06 would prefer the hedging 
strategies that used the options market. In addition, if option hedging strategies were not 
available producers with RAC's greater then — 0. 03 would prefer to hedge all, I/3, or I/4 
of their potential production in December. Hedging six months before harvest in a long 
year was preferred because prices are at their highest when the future contracts are first 
issued. Thus allowing the hedger a higher probability of locking into a futures price that 
was greater then their cost of production. 
For a short crop year the DCE results indicated that persons who have RAC's 
less then — 0. 02 would prefer to hedge all of their cotton in May after planting, but 
persons who have RAC's greater then — 0. 02 would prefer to hedge all, 1/3, or 1/4 of 
their product in December (Figure 2). Also, the DCE results showed that the hedging 
strategies that used options were least preferred in short crop years. This is 
understandable because in short crop years cash prices rise and in order to sell their 
crops at a higher price the producer is forced to let his option contract expire and thus 
loses his premium payment. 
Figure 1. Ranking of Alternative Marketing Strategies in a Long Crop Year Using Certainty 
Equivalents Assuming an Exponential Utility Function 
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Figure 2. Ranking of Alternative Marketing Strategies in a Short Crop Year Using Certainty 
Equivalents, Assuming an Exponential Utility Function 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The most significant problem facing agriculture is price volatility. Farm prices 
are unstable as evidenced by the wide swings in Texas cotton prices. The foreseeable 
future indicates that Texas cotton producers face decreased demand and more volatile 
prices. FAPRI's January 2001 Baseline projects continued weak demand for U. S. cotton 
exports and low prices through 2009. Increased price risk in an era of low prices has put 
even greater pressure on Texas cotton farmers to find better ways to manage price risk 
while marketing their produce. 
Farmers have risk management tools in the futures and options markets that 
could help them with the problems they face regarding price volatility. Questions 
remain about how they should hedge their crops, when they should hedge, and in which 
market they should hedge their commodity. The purpose of this thesis was to analyze 
alternative marketing strategies in both the futures and options markets. 
A simulation model was developed to simulate weekly cash and future prices and 
option premiums for cotton in West Texas. The model was simulated to analyze the 
economic consequences of alternative hedging strategies. The hedging strategies 
analyzed were: 
Cash — sell all cotton at the fourth week of November cash price. 
Dec All — short hedge all cotton the first week the pro-off price is greater then the cost of 
production. 
Dec I/3 — short hedge I/3 of the cotton the first three weeks the pro-off price is greater 
then the cost of production. 
Dec I/4 — short hedge I/4 of the cotton the first four weeks the pro-off price is greater 
then the cost of production. 
May All — short hedge all cotton the first week, after May I, that the pro-off price is 
greater then the cost of production. 
May I/3 — short hedge I/3 of the cotton the first three weeks, after May I, that the pro- 
off price is greater then the cost of production. 
May I/4 — short hedge I/4 of the cotton the first four weeks, aiter May I, that the pro-off 
price is greater then the cost of production. 
In Money — sell a put option the first week that the in the money pro-off price is greater 
then the cost of production. 
Out Money — sell a put option the first week that the out of the money pro-off price is 
greater then the cost of production. 
For the analysis, the hedging strategies were tested for both long and short crop 
years. In a long crop year all eight hedging strategies resulted in lower relative price risk 
(coefficient variation) then the cash sales strategy. Five of the hedging strategies cut the 
relative price risk associated with cash sales from 21 percent to about 11 percent. In a 
short crop year the relative price risk was reduced slightly for only three of the eight 
hedging strategies. 
Stochastic dominance was used to rank the alternative marketing strategies. The 
results are inconclusive because the order of preference differs from the lower RAC to 
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the upper RAC. For example, in the long crop year results, the cash sales strategy is 
ranked first for the lower RAC and cash sales is ranked last for the upper RAC. In 
addition, the short crop years in the stochastic dominance rankings also are not 
consistent within the — 0. 2 to 0. 2 RAC intervals tested. The risk averse decision maker 
would rank the Dec All hedging strategy first, followed by the Dec I/4 and Dec I/3 
strategies. Decision makers with this level of risk aversion would rank the two strategies 
that used options the lowest. 
A second risk ranking procedure, dynamic certainty equivalence (DCE) was used 
to indicate likely preferences among the marketing strategies. For a long crop year the 
DCE results indicate that persons who have RAC's less then — 0. 06 would prefer cash 
sales, but persons who have RAC's greater then — 0. 06 would prefer the hedging 
strategies that used the options market. Finely, for a short crop year the DCE results 
indicated that persons who have RAC's less then — 0. 02 would prefer to hedge all of their 
cotton in May after planting, but persons who have RAC's greater then — 0, 02 would 
prefer to hedge all, I/3, or I/4 of their product in December 
In conclusion, this study reveals that West Texas cotton farmers could better 
manage price risk by using a marketing strategy that involves the uses of the futures 
market for cotton. In short crop years risk averse decision makers would prefer to hedge 
their crop in December. In long crop years producers who are risk averse and 
moderately risk loving would prefer to use a marketing strategy that calls for purchasing 
puts on the options market. 
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